http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/blog/2008/09/12/moyer-and-judicial-selection/ Up To The Minute Analysis Of Ohio Public Policy Fri, 30 Oct 2009 15:34:40 -0400 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.1 hourly 1 http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/blog/2008/09/12/moyer-and-judicial-selection/comment-page-1/#comment-1092 James Nesbitt Fri, 12 Sep 2008 22:21:07 +0000 http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/blog/?p=2831#comment-1092 The stability and fairness of law is most fragile not when a candidate is running for his first election as a judge, but when a current judge is looking to win favor with the voters from whom he is seeking re-election. This difference is due to the fact that a sitting judge has the power to decide cases and interpret law while a mere candidate for the bench does not. Sitting judges thus face an incentive to side with popular opinion in their rulings, whether or not the popular opinion agrees with the law. Moyer's plan fails to address the biggest flaw with elected judges by allowing voters to "end or continue their tenure" in "retention" elections, a system that would let this dangerous incentive remain unabated. The stability and fairness of law is most fragile not when a candidate is running for his first election as a judge, but when a current judge is looking to win favor with the voters from whom he is seeking re-election. This difference is due to the fact that a sitting judge has the power to decide cases and interpret law while a mere candidate for the bench does not. Sitting judges thus face an incentive to side with popular opinion in their rulings, whether or not the popular opinion agrees with the law. Moyer’s plan fails to address the biggest flaw with elected judges by allowing voters to “end or continue their tenure” in “retention” elections, a system that would let this dangerous incentive remain unabated.

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